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ABSTRACT 
The use of electronic on-board recorders (EOBR) for maintaining drivers' record 
of duty status (RODS) can be dated to the 1970's. To improve American roadway safety, 
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) started exploring the use of 
EOBR in the mid 1980'ss (RODS; Freund & Thomas, 1999). In 2004, Company XYZ 
initiated a project to use XATA Corporation's OpCenterB EOBR as a means of 
monitoring an estimated fleet size of 160 commercial motor vehicles. In the initial 
proposal, Company XYZ anticipated receiving some regulatory benefits of using XATA 
OpCenterB EOBR, but not as a system to meet compliance requirements set forth by the 
FMCSA. The purpose of this study was to evaluate Company XYZ's current on-board 
monitoring system as an integrated tool for complying with the FMCSA's regulations 
outlined in Code of Federal Regulation 49 for motor carriers. This research evaluated 
FMCSA compliance reviews along with Safestat. The study also explored the regulations 
for compatibility within the format available by XATA OpCenter, a final evaluation 
summarized the respective strengths and deficiencies for compliance management. The 
findings of the research indicated that the XATA OpCenter 6.4 EOBR platform provides 
limited application for the purpose of a stand-alone FMCSA compliance, but can be 
adapted to work within an established compliance programs. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Commercial motor vehicles (CMVs) comprise 3% of all the vehicles in the nation 
and travel 7% of the annual miles for the nation, but they are involved in 9% of the 
crashes (Freund & Thomas, 1999). While the majority of the collisions involving CMVs 
have a primary cause resulting from non-CMVs (J.J. Keller and Associates, 2006), the 
CMV is involved in one out of every eight fatalities. This rate of fatalities is a major 
concern for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Association (FMCSA) because driver error 
fiom CMVs is still a key contributing factor in the occurrence of traffic-related crashes 
(Misener, n. d.). 
To improve the safety of the American roadways in the late 19807s, the FMCSA 
started exploring the use of electronic on-board recording (EOBR) devices, an equivalent 
to the airline industry's "black box" as a means of recording a driver's record of duty 
status (RODS; Freund & Thomas, 1999). The use of EOBRs for maintaining RODS 
originated in the European transportation industry in the 1970's. Since European 
implementation, the CMV collision involvement has dropped by 30% (Misener, n. d.). 
While the apparent use of EOBRs has been shown to have a positive effect on the safe 
operation of CMVs in Europe, the American transportation industry has been hesitant to 
adopt the technology because of privacy concerns, user-friendliness, and dependability of 
the monitoring device (Freund & Thomas, 1999). 
In 2000, the FMCSA issued the Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making for 
Code of Federal Regulation 49 parts385, 390, and 395, which amended CMV drivers' 
hours of service (HOS) effective since 1962 (FMCSA, 2004). The 2000 notice originally 
included the mandatory use of EOBRs for recording a driver's RODS. In the final rule 
published September 30,2003 the FMCSA removed the mandatory use of EOBRs which 
lead several highway safety advocacy groups to file a petition (FMCSA, 2005). In June of 
2004, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case Public Citizens et 
al. v. FMCSA 374 F3d 1209, at 121 6. In June, the court released their ruling, which 
threw out the 2003 HOS requirements. According to the FMCSA (2005), "in dicta the 
court also stated that:. . . (3) failing to collect and analyze data on.. . [EOBRs] probably 
violated section 408 of the ICC Termination Act, which requires FMCSA to 'deal with' 
EOBR's" (FMCSA, 2005, p. 49979-49980). On September 30,2004, the FMCSA 
released an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rule Making regarding the use of EOBR's 
(FMCSA, 2005), with a final ruling which was delayed to late 2006 (J.J. Keller associate, 
personal communication, October 1 1, 2006). This ruling by the Court of Appeals may 
suggest that the FMCSA must move past the motor carriers' continuing objections and 
develop the regulation for the benefit of the nations, as requested by the United States 
Congress on several occasions. 
In 2004, Company XYZ initiated a pilot project to use XATA Corporation's 
OpCenterB version 6.4.0, a brand of EOBR, as a means to test the potential of 
monitoring an estimated fleet size of 160 power units and straight trucks, 260 drivers, and 
variously configured trailers at 2 1 locations. The original intent of the pilot project, to 
monitor fleet safety performance, came on the heels of several severe collisions, of which 
one resulted in a fatality. These collisions revolve around a unique operating 
environment, which involves all types of road surfaces as well as times of day. In the 
initial proposal, the company anticipated receiving some regulatory benefits of using 
XATA OpCenterB EOBR, under the assumption that their use would be based on the 
voluntary use outlined in current regulation. The use of OpCenterB as the primary 
regulatory tool was not documented. Therefore, Company XYZ has never 
comprehensively evaluated their current EOBR system to determine if the device will be 
able to meet compliance requirements set forth by the FMCSA. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate Company XYZ's current on-board 
monitoring system as an integrated tool for complying with the FMCSA's regulations 
outlined in Code of Federal Regulation 49 for motor carrier operations. 
Goals of the Study 
The first goal of this study was to evaluate how an EOBR system could assist in 
meeting FMCSA regulatory requirements through an evaluation of FMCSA property 
carrying motor carriers' regulations reviewed during a compliance case. 
The second goal was to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of an integrated 
XATA Corporation's OpCenterB EOBR to meet regulatory requirements set forth by the 
FMCSA for Company XYZ. 
Background and Signzficance 
In 200 1, Company XY and Company Z merged to form Company XYZ, 
including the merger of two fleets with different operating principles. Prior to the merger, 
one of the companies started exploring the application of EOBRs to evaluate and improve 
fleet management. Following the merger, there was an undertaking at the corporate level 
to implement the EOBR system throughout Company XYZ's fleet operation. At the time 
of this paper, the initial project plan was to place a data collection-base server at each 
location and eventually have all area servers connected to a host server at the corporate 
headquarters. In the process of integrating the on-board monitoring system, the project 
suffered several setbacks including loss of commitment from project personnel, 
downgrading the project's priority, and position promotion/reassignment/separation. 
Other constraints to the implementation have been hardwarelsoftware stability issues and 
project layout. These constraints have left the implementation stage of the on-board 
monitoring system at a critical place. 
The significance for implementing an EOBR system for Company XYZ may 
provide several benefits that would improve profitability through reducing labor costs in 
database and record management. A uniform tool would also allow for company 
standards to be developed and provide a uniform evaluation process and focus resources 
to areas that are below those standards. 
Limitations of the Study 
There are some limitations to the application of this study. The first limitation is 
that of changing regulations. At the time this research was conducted, the FMCSA was 
expected to release their Notice of Proposed Rule Making for EOBRs. The notice may 
eliminate the current optional use of EOBRs and the current guidance may be altered. 
Another limitation is company-specific data. The commodity which is transported (i.e. 
livestock and feed products) requires their equipment to be operated primarily on rural/ 
secondary roads that do not have uniform standards for speed limits and road design that 
may affect the functionality of the equipment in their specific operating environment. 
Another limitation is the EOBR version and configuration. XATA periodically releases 
versions to address changes that improve the functionality of the equipment or in 
response to changes in regulations. When these changes occur, limitations addressed in 
this research may be incorporated into the revised release. This research will evaluate the 
configuration of OpCenter using an electronic key; a wireless configuration of the system 
may have strengths and weaknesses not accounted for by the research. 
DeJinition of Terms 
Commercial motor vehicle (CMV). ". . .a motor vehicle that is designed or 
regularly used to carry freight, merchandise, or more that ten passengers, whether 
loaded or empty, including busses, but not including vehicles used for vanpools, 
or vehicles built and operated as recreational vehicles." (FMCSA, n.d., 5658.5) 
Electronic on-board recorders (EOBR). 
"an electric, electronic, electromagnetical, or mechanical device capable of 
recording driver's [sic] duty status information accurately and automatically as 
required by § 395.15. The device must be integrally synchronized with specific 
operations of the commercial motor vehicle in which it is installed. At a 
minimum, the device must record engine use, road speed, miles driven, the date 
and time of day." (DOT, n. d., p. 53387) 
Record of duty status (RODS). The form (also referred to as the logbook) used by 
all drivers, when required, to record all of their off-duty time, on-duty time and 
driving time (M. Krornrie, personal communication, 2004). 
Chapter 11: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate Company XYZ's current EOBR system 
as an integrated tool for complying with the FMCSA's regulations outlined in Code of 
Federal Regulation 49 for motor carrier operations. The purpose of this literature review 
was to examine XATA Corporation's products and services, Code of Federal Regulations 
49 and the parts pertaining to the DOT compliance reviews, and the compliance review 
process, which includes the FMCSA's Safestat. 
x4 TA 
XATA Corporation@ (XATA) was founded in 1985 as a msulufacturer and 
provider of EOBR technology and supporting products through merging truck based 
equipment, wireless communication, GPS technology and supporting software with a 
focus on private fleets (Wittey, 2004). In 1989, XATA released their first EOBR system, 
OpCenter, and the next generation for XATA's EOBR, XATANET, was released in 2003 
Source: XATA, 2005a 

XATA (200%) also provided a side-by-side comparison of the two platforms 
illustrated in Figure 3 : 
--= I Madel OpCenter 
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Source: XATA, 200% 
One of the concerns raised during an open forum at the "2006 XATA User 
Conference" hosted by XATA Corporation regarding OpCenterB, centered around 
XATA's position on the life of the platform and XATA's effort to support OpCenterB 
(XATA representative, personal communication, October 2,2006). The 2006 conference 
suggested that OpCenterB was a valuable platform and would be around for the extended 
future, a reversal from the previous conference's position implying that OpCenterB had 
past maturity and in the near future, that its use may be discontinued. Customers of 
OpCenter were encouraged to prepare to move to XATANET. XATA's position reversal 
was based on the customer security requirement that allows the customer to use intranet 
security controls that cannot currently be reached with the internet based XATAIVET. An 
example would be a customer transporting pharmaceutical or hazardous materials that 
might prefer or be required to have stricter security of their intranet to manage 
transportation equipment, where a security breach may have substantial negative 
consequences for the motor carrier and the public. 
Another concern raised during the open forum was response time to correct errors 
in the system that have been identified by customers. The example provided was ''fuel 
smoothing" (XATA representative, personal communication, October 2,2006) or the 
practice of notifying customers of corrective programs for identified programming 
problems (XATA representative, personal communication, September 21,2006). A 
Company XYZ representative explained that because of fuel smoothing, they spend an 
estimated one hour per day correcting errors which is necessary for valid reports. 
The tools of OpCenterB are based on several key areas (XATA, 2003). The system first 
requires the input of driver, equipment and location fields (i.e. company facilities, 
customers, etc.) that are uniquely identified and monitored. The OpCenter also has the 
function to set up either company or fleet standards for equipment operations (i.e. 
prelpost and equipment standards, diagnostics, speed, etc.), and driver-related options 
(logging, GPS positioning, travel times, etc.). These standards are then evaluated against 
the actual performance, and entered into reports that can be accessed through Frontline. 
The responsible representative can evaluate the information and edit any discrepancies 
before reviewing reports and evaluating the performance of the equipment, individual 
drivers or fleet activities. 
Federal Motor Carriers Safety Administration (FMCSA) 
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), under the authority 
of the Department of Transportation (DOT), regulates motor carriers in the United States 
(J.J. Keller and Associates, 2006). The creation of the FMCSA can be dated to 1887 and 
the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to regulate pricing and 
competition among the railroad industry. This authority was extended to the operation of 
motor carriers in 1935 by President Roosevelt (United States DOT, 2005). Along with 
regulating competition among motor carriers, the ICC was also responsible for 
establishing driver qualifications, maximum work schedules, developing equipment 
standards and granting authority to a motor carrier to operate (Barrett, 2005). The ICC 
was the primary authority for the trucking industry until the ICC Termination Act of 
1995, which involved restructuring the DOT and transferring the oversight from the 
Office of Motor Carriers to the Federal Highway Administration. In late 1999, President 
Clinton signed the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 which removed the 
Office of Motor Carriers from the Federal Highway Administration jurisdiction. In March 
2000, the new FMCSA launched with a "mission to reduce crashes, injuries, and fatalities 
involving large trucks and buses to significantly improve truck and bus safety on the 
nation's highways" (Barrett, 2005, p. 46). Though the FMCSA roots can be traced back 
over a century, this relatively new body has been charged with improving roadway safety 
through a combination of education and updating outdated policies while balancing the 
delicate operating environment that has evolved between shippers, receivers, motor 
carriers and the gross domestic product. 
Compliance Review 
Compliance reviews are a means of evaluating a selected motor carrier's 
management effectiveness of operating safety by maintaining regulatory compliance. The 
incorporation of reviewing motor carriers was dated to 1967 when the Federal Highway 
Administration started conducting compliance reviews and reporting their findings to 
ICC (JJ Keller and Associates, 2006). In 2005, the FMCSA conducted 8,097 compliance 
reviews of over-the-road and short-haul motor carriers. The greatest concern with the 
compliance review process is not in the methodology of the review process, but rather the 
frequency in which they are conducted (Keane, 1993). The largest complaint from special 
interest groups is that the since the creation of the FMCSA, the number of annual 
compliance reviews has decreased as the selection emphasis from FMCSA shifts to 
SafeStat data for compliance review selections. 
The selection of a motor carrier for a compliance review is initiated for several 
reasons (JJ Keller and Associates, 2006). The predominate selection tool is FMCSA's 
electronic statistical data base that collects information on all carriers with a DOT 
number called "SafeStat," which generates a federal or state compliance review if safety 
values for two or more areas reach a value of 75 or above. Another reason a compliance 
review may be performed is as a follow up to a previously performed compliance review 
that resulted in a "conditional" or "unsatisfactory" rating and a motor carrier receives 
complaints that justify a review. There are two non-safety factors that would result in the 
FMCSA performing a compliance review; the carrier has just received operating 
authority and needs to receive a safety rating, or by the request of the motor carrier. 
The compliance review requirements are found in 49 CFR part 5385.5 (a) through 
(k) and part 5382 outlining the areas covered during a compliance review (J.J. Keller and 
Associates, 2006). These regulations are divided into six factors: general, driver 
qualification, operatingldriving, vehiclelmaintenance, hazardous materials, and crash 
(recordable crash rate; Wisconsin DOT, 2003). Each of the six categories is given one of 
three ratings: satisfactory, conditional, or unsatisfactory. Carriers with two or more areas 
rated unsatisfactory or one unsatisfactory and more than two conditional areas are not 
allowed government contracts and can be stripped of operating privileges. Conditional 
ratings are given when one factor is unsatisfactory and two or less areas are conditional 
or more than two areas are rated conditional. Satisfactory marks are awarded only if two 
or less conditional factors are identified (JJ Keller and Associates, 2006). 
The controlled substance and alcohol regulations (Part 382) require a motor 
carrier to provide supporting documentation that the motor carrier has a formal drug and 
alcohol policy that addresses when a DOT controlled substance and alcohol test is to be 
administered, procedures for a positive sample, what records are to be maintained and for 
how long, and what training has been provided to supervisors and drivers (Wisconsin 
DOT, 2003). The Wisconsin DOT (2003) outlined various areas as constituting a serious 
violation: failing to implement an alcohol and controlled substance program, using a 
driver having a blood alcohol concentration of 0.04 or greater, using a driver who refused 
to submit to an alcohol or controlled substance test, and using a driver known to have 
tested positive for controlled substances. Though, on paper, all categories are weighted 
equality, a deficiency in the alcohol and controlled substance program may have the 
greatest severity to the motor carrier being reviewed. 
The commercial driver's license (CDL) standards (Part 383) indicate that a driver 
of a CMV needs to have the proper class of license for the vehicle being operated (J.J. 
Keller and Associates, 2006). The license classes are "A" for gross vehicle weight 
(GVW) or gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) over 26,000 pounds with trailers over 
10,000 pounds; "B" for over 26,000 pounds with trailers 10,000 pounds or less; and "C" 
for vehicles below the GVWR or GVW of 26,000 and have trailers 10,000 or less, but 
haul passengers or hazardous materials. Serious violations in this category include 
"allowing, requiring, permitting, or authorizing a driver to operate a CMV, whose CDL 
has been suspended, revoked or canceled by a State or.. . is disqualified to operate and 
CMV," "allowing.. .an employee with more than one CDL to operate a CMV," and 
<< allowing.. . a driver to drive who is disqualified to drive" (Wisconsin DOT, 2003, p. 7). 
The minimum insurance coverage outlined in Part 387 is based on vehicle weight 
as well as cargo type. Vehicles weighing 10,000 pounds or less require $300,000 worth 
of insurance coverage; vehcles over 10,000 pounds that do not haul hazardous materials 
require $750,000 in coverage; vehicles hauling hazardous materials must posses at least 
one million dollars worth of coverage; and vehicles that transport passengers and haul 
class A and B explosives or more than 3,500 gallons of hazardous materials require a 
minimum of five million dollars in coverage (JJ Keller and Associates, 2006). The motor 
carrier must also have on file an MCM-90 or MCM-83 which are certification forms that 
are required by the FMCSA that are certified by the insurer that the motor carrier, among 
other things, have a specified level of coverage for a given period of time, similar to the 
auto insurance cards. A serious violation is "operating a motor vehicle without.. . the 
required minimum levels of financial responsibility coverage" (Wisconsin DOT, 2003, p. 
8). 
Maintaining an accident register and copies of accident reports (Part 390) is 
required for accidents that result in a fatality, medical treatment away from the accident 
scene, and/or where at least one vehicle needing to be towed away from the scene (JJ 
Keller and Associates, 2006). At a minimum, the accident register must include the 
accident date, location, the driver's name, the number of fatalities and DOT injuries, and 
whether there was a release of hazardous material. The primary violation that is sited by 
Wisconsin DOT is "making or causing to make fraudulent or intentionally false 
statements of records and/or reproducing fraudulent records" (Wisconsin DOT, 2003, p. 
10). 
The qualification of drivers (Part 391) needs to be filed with the following 
information included: 
The driver's application for employment. 
The driver's medical examiner's certificate. 
The driver's medical waiver, if one has been granted. 
The driver's certificate of road test (a legible photocopy of a valid commercial 
driver's license is an acceptable substitute if the driver was road tested for the 
class of vehicle the driver will operate). 
A written record of investigation (preceding 3 years) of past employers contacted 
to verify applicant's previous employment. 
A response from a state agency about employee's driving record from the past 3 
years (if a driver held a driver's license in multiple states, each state must be 
contacted). 
A response from each state agency to the annual driving record inquiry. 
An annual review of driving record showing date of review and who performed 
the review. 
An annual list or certificate relating to violations of motor vehicle laws. 
(Minnesota DOT, p. 37) 
Concerning the operator driving commercial motor vehicles, Part 392 of the 
Federal Motor Carries Safety Regulation (FMCSRs) states that the drivers must operate 
their vehicles within the confines of local, state or federal laws (FMCSA, n. d.). Placing a 
CMV in to service, Part 393, addresses the minimum necessary equipment that is 
required to be installed and operational at all times while the vehicle is in service. 
Evaluation of these two regulations along with motor vehicle accidents is currently 
monitored on a 30 month rolling average through Safestat. During the compliance 
review, these factors, along with motor vehicle accidents, are recalculated using the miles 
driven to determine the safety rating. Values exceeding the threshold are considered 
unsatisfactory and those under are considered satisfactory (Company XYZ representative, 
personal communication, 200 1). 
Another component of the compliance review is an evaluation of the HOS 
regulation Part 395 of the FMCSR's (JJ Keller and Associates, 2006). While the number 
of drivers reviewed may fluctuate, the standards that are evaluated remain the same. The 
selected drivers and the company are considered compliant if the selected driver has a 
minimum of 10 hours off duty before a maximum of 1 1 hours of driving or working more 
than 14 hours in a single tour of duty period. The drivers workweek also cannot exceed 
60 hours in seven days or 70 hours in eight days for seven day a week operations (JJ 
Keller and Associates, 2006), or compliance to any declared provision allowed in federal 
or state regulations (Wisconsin DOT, 2003). To verify the accuracy of the RODS, time 
and dated documents are compared to the written records. These include but are not 
limited to receipts for fuel, scalelweighting of vehicles, and shipping papers, payroll 
records, and on-board computer data (JJ Keller and Associates, 2003; Wisconsin DOT, 
2003). Critical violations for this category center around either false or no records and 
physical qualifications where drivers are in violation of the substance abuse standards (JJ 
Keller and Associates, 2006). 
The final area that would be reviewed is vehicle inspection, repair, as well as 
maintenance, and Part 396 of the FMCSR's, which states that all "parts and accessories 
shall be in safe and proper operating condition at all times" (FMCSA, n. d., $396.3(a)(l)). 
These include those specified in Part 393, "any additional parts and accessories which 
may affect safety of operation, including but not limited to, frame and frame assemblies, 
suspension systems, axles and attaching parts, wheels and rims, and steering systems 
(FMCSA, n. d., 396.3 et seq.).." "For vehicles [operated by motor carrier] for 30 
consecutive days or more" needs to be marked and all maintenance records need to 
"indicate the nature and due date of the various inspection and maintenance operations 
performed; a record of inspections, repairs and maintenance [performed] that indicate 
their date and nature." These records need to be maintained at a minimum of one year or 
for six months after the vehicle is sold (FMCSA, n. d., 396.3 et seq.). Violations in this 
category include either using equipment that has been marked out-of-service or failing to 
correct out-of-service defects (Wisconsin DOT, 2003). 
The transportation of hazardous materials, driving, and parking rule violations 
(Part 397) along with violation of hazardous materials regulations (Parts 170 through 
177), and hazardous materials incidents are outside the operating authority of Company 
XYZ. Therefore, a review of these regulations will not be addressed in this literature 
review. 
SafeStat 
One of the tools used to evaluate the operating safety of motor carriers is the 
Motor Carrier Safety Status Measurement System commonly referred to as "SafeStat" 
("Caution Urged," 2006). Prior to implementation of SafeStat, the FMCSA's evaluation 
of safety fitness of an individual motor carrier's performance was based solely on the 
outcome of a DOT compliance review that had three ratings, satisfactory, conditional, or 
unsatisfactory, which would remain in effect until the next review. As part of the 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 199 1, the United States Congress 
requested that this method be reviewed (John A. Volpe National Transportation System 
Center, 2004). The DOT responded by initiating a research project lead by the John A. 
Volpe Center in 1993 that laid the foundation for SafeStat. After two years of 
development, the first version of SafeStat was released, and by 1999, the DOT made the 
system available to the public. 
The data available allows the FMCSA to evaluate individual motor carriers on a 
30 month rolling average against all other carriers in their operational field, which the 
FMCSA views as an advancement from previous evaluation processes (John A. Volpe 
National Transportation System Center, 2004). Though the FMCSA views SafeStat as a 
significant step forward the system it has critics, and the DOT agency itself raised a 
question about the data accuracy following an internal audit of the FMCSA (Schultz, 
2004). The biggest criticism of the SafeStat methodology, as voiced by an unnamed 
official within the DOT agency, is the manner in which data is inputted. For the system to 
provide reliable data, it relies on three sources which includes: compliance review 
findings, motor carrier provided census data, and individual states' reporting. The data 
from carriers and state agencies is assumed to be accurate, but routinely they provided 
inaccurate or no data ("FMCSA Officials," 2004), which crippled the validity of the 
SafeStat model (Schultz, 2004). There are no uniform standards which allow states to 
potentially file different records to the same situation. Another concern from motor 
carriers is the exploitation of carrier and driver-specific information (e.g. corporate 
litigation and identity theft; "FMCSA Officials," 2004). The FMCSA has acknowledged 
these concerns and has requested that carriers review the information for accuracy. 
Another step taken by the FMCSA was to remove driver and several carrier information 
fields from public view and only be available to a specific carrier with a password (M. 
Kromrie, personal communication, September, 2004). Though it can be argued that 
SafeStat has several deficiencies, the FMCSA ultimately uses the SafeStat information as 
a means of evaluating a motor carrier's safety performance. 
SafeStat serves several functions for the FMCSA in that it prioritizes carriers' 
compliance reviews, assists in identifying and monitoring poorly performing carriers, and 
provides a recommendation during roadside inspections for specific carriers ("Caution 
Urged," 2006). Additional roles for SafeStat include assisting government agencies in 
performing contract selection for motor carriers, allowing the carrier to conduct self- 
evaluation of their safety performance, and also assisting private business to evaluate a 
third-party carrier's safety performance (John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems 
Center, 2004). 
As part of its analysis function, SafeStat provides an overall safety-rating based 
on four categories: accidents, driver inspections, vehicle inspections, and management 
review (Figure 3; John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 2004, p. 2-1). 
Carriers that score a 75 or above in two areas are considered a higher compliance review 
priority on both a federal and state level ("Caution Urged," 2006). The data for the four 
areas comes from the states' reporting of commercial vehicle DOT recordable crashes, 
compliance reviews, enforcement cases, roadside inspections that include moving 
violations, and motor carrier census data. From this pool, the data collected on the motor 
carrier for categories of accidents, driver, and vehicle, are evaluated on a 30-month 
rolling average. The management category score is applicable for 18 months following a 
compliance review or two closed enforcement cases. An example would be an 
investigated DOT recordable accident within the past 72 months. Census data, number of 
drivers, power units and miles traveled are collected when a carrier applies for operating 
authority and then on a bi-annual basis where SafeStat then uses this data to standardize 
the motor carrier data across the industry. When the carrier's overall scores are 
calculated, very few have values assigned in the management category because of the 
relatively short period of time they are valid in the SafeStat model along with the small 
portion of annual compliance reviews to registered motor carriers. 
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Figure 4. SafeStat Score Computational Hierarchy 
Source: John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 2004, p. 2-1 
SafeStat: Accident Safety Evaluation Area 
As part of the SafeStat analysis process, the Accident Involvement Indicator (AII) 
calculates the accident score using the crash date, injury, fatality, and hazardous material 
release information (John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 2004). 
SafeStat uses the following formula: "Total ConsequenceITime Weighted Crash Value 
(TCTWA) I (average number of power units)" (John A. Volpe National Transportation 
Systems Center, 2004, p. 3-2). Crashes resulting in an injury or fatality are given a factor 
of two, or collisions resulting in only a towed vehicle receive a weight of one. If a 
hazardous material was released, one point is added to the severity. The crashes are then 
broken into three time segments starting with the most recent month; accidents occurring 
in the previous zero to six months receive a weight of three, seven to 18 months would 
receive a weight of two, and those occurring within the previous 19 to 30 months would 
receive a weight of one. Collisions older than 30 months are not calculated. These three 
areas are then weighted together to provide the TCTWA. To determine the average 
number of power units, the total number of power units are separated into groups and 
weighted similarly to the above TCTWA and added together and then divided by three. 
The A11 is then categorized into six groups according to the number of accidents, where 
they are assigned a percentile ranking. 
During a compliance review, a Recordable Accident Rate (RAR) can be 
calculated with the following formula: RAR = 1,000,000 x (# or recordable crashes) I 
vehicle miles traveled. At that point, depending on the number of recordable accidents, 
the carrier is assigned to one of four categories (John A. Volpe National Transportation 
Systems Center, 2004), and a score is assigned according to the SafeStat algorithm. 
SafeStat: Driver Safety Evaluation Area 
The Driver Inspection Measure (DIM) uses the total number of out of service 
violations (DOOSV), the number of drivers placed out of service (OOSD), and the 
number of inspections (DI), which are categorized and time weighted (TW) in the same 
manner addressed as the vehicle indicator(According to John A. Volpe National 
Transportation Systems Center, 2004),. An additional multiplier accounts for drivers 
violating an OOS ruling or jumping out of service (J00)  (John A. Volpe National 
Transportation Systems Center, 2004).This information is then calculated by ((TW 
DOOSV + TW OOSD) I DI) x jumping out of service multiplier (JOOM) = DIM. The 
DIM is then grouped according to the total number of inspections for the 30 months and 
assigned a percentile ranking in that group to determine the Driver Involvement Indicator 
(DII). 
According to John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (2004), the 
next calculation is the number of moving violations, which is weighted and categorized in 
the same manner mentioned above, and provides the TW moving violation. The driver 
calculation is determine as follows (DII*2 + MVI) / 3 = SEA. 
Safestat: Vehicle Safety Evaluation Area 
The vehicle indicator looks at the number of OOS vehicle violations and the 
number of inspected vehicles to calculate the vehicle involvement measure using the 
formula ([TWA # OOS Violations + TWA # of OOS Vehicles] / TWA of inspections) = 
VIM (John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 2004). The vehicle 
involvement indicators are then established by ranking the carrier among four categories 
according to the number of violations and then are assigned a percentile ranking 
accordingly the SafeStat algorithm. 
SafeStat: Management Safety Evaluation Area 
The safety management evaluation draws a score from one of the three following 
areas: enforcement history, hazardous material reviews, or safety management reviews 
(John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 2004). For these areas to be 
calculated, the company would need two have two closed enforcement cases, a focused 
compliance review of a specific factor or individual in the past 72 months, a hazardous 
material review in the past 18 months, or a safety management review in the past 18 
months (John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 2004). If a carrier does 
not meet the above criteria, no score will be assigned for the management review 
category and the management category will be removed from the calculation of the 
overall SafeStat score. 
$395: Hours of Service (HOS) 
The origins of commercial motor vehicle drivers being required to maintain a 
RODS can be dated to the 1930's and the ICC (FMCSA, 2005). In the original HOS 
requirements, a driver could only work a 15-hour tour of duty in a 24-hour period, going 
from midnight to midnight or noon to noon. The first notable change came in 1962 when 
the 15-hour tour of duty in a 24-hour period was replaced with a driver being required to 
take eight hours off after accumulating a 15-hour tour of duty. The ability for a driver to 
accumulate hours meant they could suspend their daily tour of duty by either logging off 
duty or by resting in the sleeper berth. With the way the regulations were re-written in the 
1960's, the industry adapted shipping and receiving practices that assumed the drivers 
would manipulate their hours to meet deadlines (D. Jerrell, personal communication, 
2004). This led drivers to routinely choose between what today has been established as 
adequate sleep requirements, and meeting their established shipping deadline set by the 
shippers and receivers. 
Because of the above concerns as well as additional government based concerns, 
the FMCSA released revised HOS regulations on September 30,2003 that were in effect 
from January 4,2004 until September 30,2005 (FMCSA, 2005). Changes as a result of 
these revisions reduced the total daily tour of duty to 14 hours, the daily drive time was 
extended to 1 1 hours, off duty time was increased to 10 hours, the 72 hour restart was 
reduced to 34 hours, and the ability for drivers to stop hisher clocks to extend their tour 
of duty was condensed to the sleeper berth exemption. This exemption only allowed the 
driver to split the off duty time into two sleeper berth periods equaling a minimum of 10 
hours with one of those periods not less than two hours. 
In a response to the FMCSA's advanced notice of proposed rule making 
(FMCSA, 2004) for EOBR, the American Trucking Association (ATA) stated they saw a 
statistically significant decrease in accidents after the 2003 HOS were implemented 
(FMCSA, 2005). The Motor Freight Carriers Association, along with a statement by J.B 
Hunt, responded more conservatively in that while accidents did decrease, their data was 
inconclusive in establishing that the revised HOS requirements were the primary 
contributing factor (FMCSA, 2005). 
While there were indications that the 2003 HOS requirements were reducing 
collisions, the comments received by the FMCSA regarding specific components to the 
HOS revealed a more subjective response based on the interests of the various positions 
of the respondents (DOT, n. d.). Safety advocacy respondents supported the reduction of 
daily tour time, eliminating the ability of a driver to extend indefinitely their tour, and 
increasing minimum off duty time. Respondents for highway safety refuted the extension 
of the daily drive time, reducing the restart provision from 72 hours to 34, and the 
sleeper-berth exemption, which allowed for daily tour of duty being extended. On the 
other side of the issue, trucking organizations, in general, supported the extension of the 
drive time by one hour, decreasing the restart provision, and the sleeper berth exemption. 
The trucking organizations opposed the elimination of the driver's ability to extend their 
workday and the decreases in daily tour of duty. The responses by drivers were mixed 
with regard to specifics of the regulation, though commenting drivers did have a fairly 
consistent concern that little attention was given to addressing the shipping and receiving 
practice of prolonged wait times between arrival time and loadinglunloading (FMCSA, 
2004). 
As a result various concerns regarding the 2003 HOS regulations, the special 
interest groups sent a petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit Court on June 12,2003 (FMCSA, 2005). The United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Court set a court date, April 15, 2004, for 
oral arguments and they reached their final ruling on July 16,2004. According to the 
FMCSA's HOS final ruling 2005, pages 49979 and 49980, they were vacated on the 
following grounds: 
1) FMCSA's justification for increasing allowable driving time from 10 to 
11 hours might be legally inadequate because the Agency failed to show how 
additional off-duty time compensated for more driving time, and especially 
because it failed to discuss the effects of the 34-hour recovery provision; 
2) splitting off-duty time in a sleeper berth into periods of less than 10 
hours was probably arbitrary and capricious, because FMCSA itself asserted that 
drivers need 8 hours of uninterrupted sleep; 
3) failing to collect and analyze data on the costs and benefits of requiring 
electronic on-board recording devices (EOBRs) probably violated section 408 of 
the ICC Termination Act, which requires FMCSA to "deal with" EOBRs; and, 
4) the Agency failed to address or justify the additional on-duty and 
driving hours allowed by the 34- hour recovery provision (FMCSA, 2005). 
This ruling resulted in President George W. Bush signing the Surface 
Transportation Extension Act of 2004, Part V (Public Law 108-3 10, 1 18 Stat. 1 144) 
which extended the 2003 HOS until September 30,2005 (FMCSA, 2005). To comply 
with the court's ruling, the FMCSA released a revised HOS regulation on August 25, 
2005, which became effective October 1,2005. The 2005 HOS principle change was with 
regard to the sleeper-berth provision. The 2003 HOS allowed drivers to extend their 14 
hour work day by staggering their sleeper birth time into two periods between the driving 
and duty time as long as no two periods violated the driving, duty, or off duty times, 
whereas the 2005 HOS sleeper birth provision required an eight hour and a two hour 
period with only the eight hour period extending the driver's 14 hour work day. When 
one compares the 1939 and the 2003 HOS requirements, this revision essentially 
eliminated the ability of the driver to use the sleeper-birth provision to extend the 14-hour 
workday and brought the driver to a circadian cycle. The final HOS rulings also created a 
separate project for the sole purpose of evaluating the required use of EOBR for 
maintaining the driver's RODS, which was addressed in point three of the circuit court's 
decision. 
Recording Record of Duty Status (RODS) and EOBR 
Since the 1940's, the standard for drivers to record their RODS has been to 
maintain paper logs until 1988, when the ICC amended the RODS format to include the 
option for companies to forego paper logs for electronic format (FMCSA, 2005). The 
data requirements for a driver recording the RODS share similarities between FMCSR 
$395.8 paper log requirements (Figure 5), and FMCSR 5395.15 the electronic log 
equivalent. The variation between the two regulations becomes apparent in the format. 
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4) The driver does not exceed 11 hours maximum driving time; 
5) The motor carrier maintains for 6 months accurate and true time records 
showing the time the driver started and ended hisfher day, the number of 
hours worked, and the work schedule for the past seven days (Minnesota 
DOT, n. d., p. 52). 
As soon as a driver knows that helshe will fail to meet any of the above requirements, 
then a log must be completed for that day. 
The logging requirements can be found at the FMCSR's 5395.8, 5395.15 et seq. 
and require RODS to be accurate to last duty status change (i.e., off duty, sleeper birth, 
driving, on duty not driving) over a 24-hour period grid FMCSA, n. d.). The paper and 
electronic logs need to include the following information: 
1) Date 
2) Total miles driving today 
3) Truck or tractor and trailer number; 
4) Name of carrier 
5) 24 hour period starting time (e.g., midnight, 9:00 a.m., noon, 3:00 p.m.) 
6) Main office address; 
7) Remarks; 
8) Name of co-driver 
9) Total hours (far right edge of grid) 
10) Shipping document number(s), or name of shipper and commodity. 
One initial difference is the requirement of a driver's signature on paper logs, but not on 
the electronic logs. The paper logs are certified by a driver as being accurate only when 
signed, where the electronic logs are interpreted to be signed as result of submittal with 
one exception; if an electronic log is printed for the purpose of an original, then that 
paper copy needs to be signed by the driver per 49 C.F.R. part 5395.1 5(b)(5). Motor 
carriers choosing to use an EOBR log management system to replace the paper log 
management will have to meet the guidelines for electronic logs outlined in FMCSR 
9395.15. 
The FMCSA (n. d.) also states that a motor carrier needs to take various factors 
into account in either the development of their own system or when purchasing services 
from a third party specific to 49 C.F.R. part 9395.15. The EOBR will need to be able to 
retrieve the driver's current and the past 718 days RODS and either print, chart or display 
those records when requested by an authorized official present. Drivers will also need to 
have their individual RODS' distinguishable drive and duty time along with that days 
accumulated miles and the authorized official will have available to them an instruction 
sheet for the EOBR in the cab. The EOBR system will also need to uniquely identify 
each driver and retrieved data can only reflect that driver (JJ Keller and Associates, 
2006). The system would also need to account for all locations and notify the driver 
visually or audibly of either sensor or system-based failures that may or have 
compromised the accuracy of the electronic RODS. The motor carrier will also need to 
follow the established calibration schedule for the EOBR system and, on a monthly basis, 
back the data up at a secondary location or format (e.g. computer disc or CD). The final 
factor that a motor carries must consider is that FMCSA has the authority to rescind the 
uses of on-board records by any motor carrier (FMCSA, n. d.). 
Summary 
The purpose of this literature review was to evaluate FMCSA's compliance 
review process, the selection of motor carrier and safety indicators through SafeStat, 
along with XATA Corporation's OpCenterB as a tool for Company XYZ's regulatory 
management. This literature reviewed suggested the key components in establishing a 
future compliance review's focus can be identified in two areas: previously performed 
compliance reviews and the motor carriers active SafeStat data. Future compliance 
reviews would evaluate what abatement procedures were implemented to correct 
previously identified deficiencies from past reviews. Another component is the SafeStat 
data, which may serve two purposes, establishing the compliance review need and 
ranking along with potential focuses for the compliance review. The combination of these 
two factors would provide a comprehensive overview of the motor carrier's safety 
management culture as well as a focal point for a motor carrier to establish self- 
improvement criteria and baselines. 
The literature review also evaluated the FMCSA compliance review categories, 
which suggested that it is not feasible for a motor carrier to solely rely on any single tool 
to meet every regulatory factor (FMCSA, n. d.). At the time of this research, the 
regulations required information to be maintained in their original form, or at a specified 
motor carrier location, andlor in formats that may not meet the functional capabilities of 
an electronic on-board computer system or any other electronic systems. The research 
also identified that some FMCSRs require sensitive documents to be maintained on 
individual drivers requiring a specified level of security for the protection of the 
employee's rights and to prevent a motor carrier from unnecessary litigation. However, 
the FMCSR did demonstrate potential opportunities for consolidation within the 
fimctionality of an electronic on-board computer system. Before a company adopts new 
methods for regulatory compliance, the organization needs to determine if a new process 
will either improve or decrease management's effectiveness. 
Chapter 111: Methodology 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate Company XYZ's current EOBR system 
as an integrated tool for complying with the FMCSA's regulations outlined in Code of 
Federal Regulation 49 for property carrying motor carrier operations. The first goal of 
this study was to evaluate how an EOBR could assist in meeting FMCSA regulatory 
requirements through an evaluation of FMCSA property carrying motor carrier 
regulations reviewed during a compliance case. The second goal was to evaluate the 
effectiveness and efficiency of an integrated XATA Corporation's OpCenterB Electronic 
on Board Recorder (EOBR) to meet regulatory requirements set forth by the FMCSA. 
Subject Selection and Description 
Human subject selection and safety did not apply to this research because no 
personal information was acquired. The evaluation of the EOBR system to meet 
regulatory compliance and the use of human subject information would not impact the 
findings. 
Instrumentation 
Two surveys were developed for this research. The first survey's objective was to 
establish a weighted needs assessment for improvements to their regulatory management 
practices for the company. This needs assessment was based on historical indicators from 
DOT compliance reviews and active DOT data within the SafeStat model. The second 
survey was designed to evaluate the use of OpCenter versus current practices for areas 
from driver involvement, collection and transfer of data, and the managers' time 
investments to authenticate and validate data. The survey allowed for subjective analysis 
of process reliability, ease of use, the design of the system to meet regulation 
requirements, the ability of the model to meet security needs for employee confidentiality 
(if applicable by regulations), each method's ability to provide reliable data, and data 
verification (if applicable by regulations). The values collected from the second survey 
would then be weighted with values established from the first survey to establish a 
weighted value for each compliance category. 
Data Collection Procedures 
Data was collected for regulations that are evaluated during a compliance review 
from FMCSA Code of Federal Regulations 49 parts 382, 383, 387, 390, 391, 395, 396, 
and 397, though the website http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/rulesregulations/administrationl 
fmcsr/fmcsrguide.asp?section~type=, with a focus on regulations related to property 
carrying motor carriers. 
Data collected from Company XYZ was conducted in conjunction with a 
company representative to ensure anonymity with confidential data. The evaluation of 
closed compliance review documents was controlled though a company official to ensure 
that company policies were maintained. Sensitive documents were reviewed at the place 
of business and these documents were not removed from the premises. The company 
official also released coded information from SafeStat that is not available to the general 
public. Prior to document review, the company official and the researcher agreed upon 
the pertinences for providing an adequate evaluation of the company's safety 
performance. 
Training and operating literature was reviewed on XATA's OpCenter for 
evaluating the application of the system to meet the above FMCSA motor carrier 
regulation for property carriers. Application screens and reports relating to equipment, 
drivers, and locations was retrieved from OpCenter with information that may identify 
the company, locations, drivers, or equipment removed prior the release to the researcher. 
Data Analysis 
An empirical analysis was conducted on the FMCSA regulations evaluated during 
a compliance review to determine the applicability for monitoring with an EOBR. 
Sensitive information requiring security or regulation not meeting the operating 
environment were removed from further analysis for integration with the EOBR. 
An empirical evaluation was conducted to assess cited deficiencies from closed 
compliance reviews and enforcement findings to access sustained management 
deficiencies and plausible concern for future compliance review for Company XYZ. A 
baseline was established through evaluating closed compliance audits. The baseline 
information was then compared against current regulatory compliance found on SafeStat. 
The current data came from the measurement and indicators regarding accidents, drivers, 
vehicles and management on Company XYZ through the information accessible on 
FMCSA's SafeStat database for the preceding 30 months. 
Regulations compatible with monitoring through OpCenter were evaluated based 
on a Likert scale weighted 1 through 5 with categories including ease of use, regulation 
specific compatibility, data security, reliability, and data verification (if applicable). The 
data collected from the Likert scale sum was then assigned a weighted value of one (1) 
for non-cited categories in safety components in either previous compliance reviews or 
SafeStat, a weight of 1.5 for deficiency in one category, and two (2) when deficient in 
both categories. The information collected was then compared between the EOBR and 
current practices to meet regulatory requirements. 
Limitations of the Study 
There are some limitations to the application of this study. The first limitation is 
changing regulations. At the time this research was conducted, the FMCSA was expected 
to release their Notice of Proposed Rule Making for EOBRs. The notice may negate the 
current optional use of EOBRs and the current guidance may be altered. Another 
limitation is company-specific data. The commodity transported requires Company 
XYZ's equipment to be operated primarily on rurallsecondary roads that do not have the 
uniform standards for speed limits and road designs that may affect the functionality of 
the equipment in their specific operating environment. Another limitation is the EOBR 
version and configuration. XATA periodically releases versions to address changes that 
improve the functionality of the equipment or in response to changes in regulations. 
When these changes occur, findings of this research may be incorporated into the revised 
release. This research will evaluate the configuration of OpCenter using an electronic 
key; a wireless configuration of the system may have strengths and weaknesses not 
accounted for by the research. 
Chapter IV: Results 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate Company XYZ's current on-board 
monitoring system as an integrated tool for complying with the FMCSA's regulations 
outlined in Code of Federal Regulation 49 for motor carrier operations. This study 
investigated Company XYZ's three previous compliance reviews and active data from 
SafeStat to establish past regulation deficiencies. This research also investigated each 
regulation's requirement for conformance to an EOBR system format. Finally, an 
analysis was conducted to compare the capabilities of XATA's OpCenter 6.4.0 
functionality against Company XYZ's current practices for complying with the 
FMCSR's. 
Data Collected oh Compliance Reviews 
An empirical evaluation was conducted of the closed compliance reviews (CR) to 
determine historical management deficiencies. Of the three compliance reviews 
conducted, two were conducted prior to the Company XYZ's merger and the most recent 
CR occurred at the onset the merger (see Table 1). Categories in Table 1 were adopted 
from Part B of the original CR's. There were two general categories; files and records. 
The files were the actual number of files reviewed and records were the number of 
documents in each file. Violations were established by the number of files and the 
number of records in each file found to be out of compliance with the FMCSR. Table 1 
used the total number of files checked and the total number of violations, which would 
provide a better comparison to the information in Table 2. Factors that did not receive 
violations were grayed out in both tables. 
Table 1 
Company XYZ Compliance Reviews (1 999 though 2006) 
C.R. 1999 (1st) C.R. 1999 (2nd) C.R. 2001 
CR Factors Files Viol. Files Viol. Files Viol. 
General 
387 - - - - - - - - 
390 - - - - - - - - 
Driver Qualification 
3 82 - - - - 4 4 - - - - 
383 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
391 #13 25 13 6 20 "14 
Operational/Driving 
392 
395 11 56 11 15 11 18 
Inspect/Maintenance 
393 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
396 - - - - 11 16 - - - - 
Hazardous 
Material 
397,171,171,180 N/A N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A N/A 
CR OOS Rate #40% #40% 25% 
CR Crash Rate 0 1.042 1.137 
Note: (*At the date of the compliance reviews no information was available for 
this category, # One of more violations resulted in a conditional rating, A One 
violation was petitioned to be removed, no further information was available) 
The findings for the compliance reviews showed that all three CRs received an 
overall satisfactory rating upon completion. CR 1999(1) resulted in two conditional 
ratings (Driver Qualification: FMCSR 391 and Vehicle Maintenance: OOS rating), CR 
1999(2) received one conditional rating (Vehicle Maintenance: OOS rating), and CR 
2001 yielding all factors as satisfactory. Of the compliance factors, driver qualification 
(FMCSR part 395) and operationalldriving (FMCSR part 391) were cited with violations 
in each compliance review, vehicle/maintenance ( 0 0 s  rating and FMCSR part 396) was 
found in violation for both 1999 CRs and a driver qualification (FMCSR part 382) 
violation only in the second 1999 CR. The outliers in CR 1999(2) resulted from not 
conducting an inquiry or retaining past employer information on a driver's controlled 
substance and alcohol information. The deficient categories that were presented in all 
CRs were driver qualification and HOS. The driver qualification violations centered on 
the management practices of driver qualification files, with inadequate records of driver 
background information and poorly maintained files. HOS service violations were the 
result of exceeding the daily drive time, daily time limit, weekly time limit, log 
falsification, and no RODS filed. From communication with the Company XYZ 
representative, Company XY had one person responsible for DOT and Occupational 
Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) compliance throughout the entire company. 
With the close proximity of the CRs to the merger, the management procedures may not 
have been consistent with a comprehensive review of all files, polices and procedures. 
Another factor is that each location is responsible for day-to-day fleet management. The 
combination of these internal factors had a direct effect on the consistency of on-site 
policy interpretation as well as the execution for compliance of FMCSRs. 
The violations found by the reviewing officers from the three audits amounted to 
two cited management deficiencies: record maintenance and day-to-day discipline to the 
FMCSR. The CRs suggest that future improvements need to address driver qualification 
requirements found in FMCSR 391 and HOS in FMCSR 395. Vehicle maintenance 
FMCSR parts 393 and 396, is also a concern with the conditional ratings of OOS 
identified in SafeStat data combined with the CR 1999(2). A special reference was made 
in the CR analysis transcript for Company XYZ in that only Company Z records were 
evaluated. The reference strongly suggested that were inconsistencies in the practices for 
FMCSR compliance between Company XY and Z. Had Company XY's vehicle files and 
records been reviewed during the 2001 CR, the satisfactory rating for 
vehicle/maintenance may well have been downgraded. 
Data Collected on SafeStat Review 
The data from SafeStat was evaluated for trends from the past 30 months, current 
safety ratings and recommendations. The data in Table 2 was collected November 5, 
2006 with a data range from March 2004 though September 2006 (Appendix A). 
Company XYZ's current inspection recommendation is at a value of 32, which equates to 
a 'pass' recommendation prior to roadside inspections. If the safety rating reaches '50' 
the rating would change to 'optional,' and 'inspect' at '75' or above. This score is 
currently based on safety performance with regard to the occurrence of accidents, drivers, 
and vehicle maintenance. The management score was excluded from calculations on the 
grounds that a compliance review had not been conducted in the past 18 months and 
Company XYZ does not have two or more enforcement cases in the past 72 months. 
Company XYZ has also maintained all active categories below a value of '75' for the 
past 30 months. 
By maintaining low overall category values, Company XYZ has been able to 
prevent the SafeStat model from assigning a carrier score and the subsequent federal and 
state CR priority ranking. Company XYZ achieved the following weighted 30 month 
category values: Accident, 12.97; driver, 0.17; vehicles, 45.5. These values were based 
on the OOS findings and DOT recordable accidents. The data available on SafeStat was 
further broken down into CR factors and FMCSR parts that were evaluated during a CR. 
The sample data was retrieved from reports on driver inspections, moving 
violations, and vehicle inspections. The data was divided into six month periods with 
period five being the oldest data and one the most recent. A list of violations by period is 
in Appendix B. Table 2, identified as Company XYZ Compliance Review and SafeStat 
Data, was expanded beyond the OOS values used by SafeStat to include all recorded 
violation to account for variations in state-to-state reporting practices. Categories that did 
not receive a violation for a time period were grayed out. 
Table 2 
Company XYZ SafeStat Data 
PERIOD 5 PERIOD 4 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 1 
Viol. 00s Viol. 00s Viol. 00s Viol. 00s Viol. 00s 
Driver Qualification 
3 82 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Vehicle/Maintenance 
393 11 1 12 5 3 3 14 5 10 1 
396 10 1 2 -- 1 -- 6 -- 2 -- 
Hazardous Materials 
397 NIA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
SafeStat Safety Evaluation Areas 
Accidents* 35.77 37.53 24.5 1 22.35 12.97 
Driver* 38.69 36.53 20.13 15.86 0.17 
Vehicle* 39.29 53.20 37.83 48.81 45.5 
Total 17 13 8 12 
Ins~ections 
14 
NOTE: (* Sores collected from SafeStat 30 month rolling average using OOS 
calculation date; September 22, 2006) 
Over the 30 months of active data which was found in Safestat, Company XYZ 
received 62 vehicle-based inspections. These were broken down in to the total 
inspections per period: period 5, 17; period 4, 13; period 3, 8; period 2, 12; period 1, 14. 
No violations were under the CR factor of Hazardous Materials, which suggests that 
Company XYZ is staying within the confines of their operating authority for the past 30 
months along with no violations under the FMCSR parts, 387, 382, and 383. At least one 
violation was found in FMCSR parts 390, 39 1, 392, 393, 395, and 396. The greatest 
number of violations were under FMCSR 393, parts and accessories necessary for safe 
operation, followed by FMCSR 396, inspection, repair and maintenance, and FMCSR 
392, driving commercial motor vehicles. An investigation into the specific violations for 
these three FMCSRs revealed the root deficiency can be linked to vehicle inspection 
process prior to drivers placing the vehicle and equipment into service. 
The scores generated from OOS violations available on driver, vehicle and 
accidents were placed under the categories of operatingldriving, vehiclelmaintenance, 
and DOT crash rates respectively. The data shows a consistent drop in driver OOS 
violations from period five at a score of 38.69 to 0.17 in period one. The significant drop 
specifics were inconclusive, but may be attributed to a combination of several factors. 
These include the change in the HOS effective January 4,2004, the 100 air mile radius 
exception eliminating a majority of logging violation opportunities, and the location with 
the greatest number of CMV's exposed to fixed roadside inspection sites had 
incorporated XATA's OpCenter into their operations. DOT accident rates over the same 
time periods also declined. This decrease was most likely the result of data for four major 
accidents at Company XYZ surpassing the 30 month time frame. Of the three categories 
evaluated, the vehicle score was that only one that did not decrease over the 30 month 
period and did not demonstrate a trend up or down. A correlation was drawn between the 
vehicle inspection measure and the violations and the CR vehiclelrnaintenance factor, 
strongly suggesting that Company XYZ's effort to abate this category's deficiencies were 
either not adequate or improperly implemented. 
The findings during the evaluation of the CRs and SafeStat revealed consistent 
deficiencies within Company XYZ's fleet operation, along with trends that may be 
addressed throughout the implementation of an EOBR system. Management deficiencies 
found in at least one CR occurred in the area of driver qualifications (FMCSR parts 382 
and 391), operationalldriving (FMCSR 395), and vehiclelrnaintenance (FMCSR 396). 
SafeStat revealed deficiencies in at least one of the five time periods for general (FMCSR 
390), driver qualifications (FMCSR 391), operationalldriving (FMCSR parts 392 and 
393,  and vehiclelrnaintenance (FMCSR parts 393 and 396). Violations occurring in both 
the CRs and SafeStat were from driver qualifications (FMSCR 391) and 
vehiclelrnaintenance (FMCSR 396). This evaluation also suggested that the most 
attention is being paid to vehiclelrnaintenance, with particular attention focused on driver 
vehicle inspection reports. 
Regulation Analysis for EOBR System Compatibility 
An empirical analysis was conducted on the FMCSA regulations evaluated during 
a compliance review to determine the applicability for monitoring with an EOBR. The 
FMCSRs were determined as incompatible with the EOBR because of the regulation 
required specific data and file security requirements, exceeded the scope of the operating 
authority of Company XYZ, or data and files in specific formats were removed from 
further analysis. 
Table 3, outlines the FMCSRs within the CR factors. The categories of hazardous 
materials and crash rate indicators were factored as non-applicable and therefore did not 
require further investigation. Company XYZ has not completed the permitting process 
because the transport of hazardous materials falls outside the confines of the primary 
transported material of livestock and feed, opting to use outside motor carriers to 
transport materials falling under the hazardous materials FMCSRs. Crash rate indicators 
were deemed non-applicable due to the historic nature of the category and the calculation 
process that is conducted at the time of the CR. 
The FMCSRs that that were deemed incompatible to integrating an EOBR system 
were FMCSR parts 387,390, and 382. FMCSR 387 which addresses financial 
responsibility, was removed based on the insurance documentation format from the 
insurance company or the self-insurance authorization from FMCSA along with the 
record keeping requirements. The FMCSR-based documentation at the principle place of 
business or inside each vehicle needs to be an original or copies of the original. FMCSR 
390 was removed based on the regulation's general overview of operating practices for 
the development of policies, procedures and day-to-day practices of fleet management 
and vehicle operation. FMCSR 382 (which addresses controlled substance and alcohol 
testing) was removed due to the requirements that all documentation on the regulation 
needs to maintained in a secured location with controlled access. FMCSRs that were 
found to have potential for integration to an EOBR system were FMCSRs 383, 391, 392, 
393, and 396. Only one regulation, FMCSR 359.15, was written for the specific purpose 
of being implemented through the use of an EOBR system in lieu of FMCSR 395.8. 
Table 3 
Regulation Compatibility with EOBR Systems 
Regulations Compatible with EOBR 
system 
Compliance Review regulations Yes Potential No N/A 
General 
5 387: Financial Responsibility ... X 
5 390: General (Transportation) X 
Driver Qualification 
5 382: Condoled Substances and Alcohol X 
5 383: C.D.L. Standards, requirements.. . 
5 39 1 :Qulaification of Drivers.. . 
OperatingIDriving 
5 392 Driving C.M.V. 
5 395: Hours-of-Service 
Vehicle Maintenance 
5 393: [CMV] Parts and Accessories.. . 
5 396: Inspection Repair and 
Maintenance 
Hazardous Materials 
5 397: Transporting Hazardous 
Materials.. . X 
5 1 7 1 : Transporting Hazardous 
Materials. . . X 
5 177: Transporting Hazardous 
Materials. . . X 
5 180: Transporting Hazardous 
Materials. . . X 
Crash 
Crash rate indicator X 
The FMCSRs found to have potential application with EOBRs were combined 
with the findings from the CR and SafeStat review in Table 4. FMCSRs and CR factors 
that were identified as non-applicable were identified as 'NIA'. Regulations that were 
identified as not compatible with EOBR system were identified as 'Removed.' The 
remaining FMCSRs were assigned a value of 1 if they were identified during any of the 
three compliance reviews or in any period of SafeStat data. The compliance review 
scores were added together for a total score. A total from the CR and SafeStat were 
weighted with a value of 1 for no violation from data in either the CR or SafeStat, a value 
of 1.5 for ether a CR or SafeStat violation, and a value of 2 for any FMCSR that was 
found to be in violation in both the CR and SafeStat. 
The results of the weighting the CR and SafeStat data provided a score of one for 
the driver qualification FMCSR 383 CDL standards and requirements. FMCSR 292 
(driving commercial motor vehicles) was weighted as 1.5 for violations found in 
SafeStat. FMCSR7s 391 (driver qualification), 395 (hour-of-service), 393 (parts and 
accessories for safe operation), and 396 (inspection repair and maintenance) received a 
weighting of 2 for violations found in both the CR and SafeStat investigations. 
Table 4 
Compliance Review FMCSR Weighting. 
Compliance Review Regulation 
Compliance Review regulations Weighting 
C.R. SafeStat Total Weight 
General 
5 3 87: Financial Responsibility.. . 
5 390: General (Transportation) 
Driver Qualification 
5 382: Controlled Substances and 
Alcohol 
5 383: C.D.L. Standards, requirements.. . 0 
5 39 1 :Qulaification of Drivers.. . 1 
Operating/Driving 
5 392 Driving C.M.V. 0 
5 395: Hours-of-Service 1 
Vehicle Maintenance 
5 393 : [CMV] Parts and Accessories.. . 0 
5 396: Inspection Repair and 
Maintenance 1 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
0 0 1 
1 2 2 
Hazardous Materials 
5 397: Transporting Hazardous 
Materials. . . N/A 
5 17 1 : Transporting Hazardous 
Materials. . . N/A 
5 1 77 : Transporting Hazardous 
Materials.. . NIA 
5 180: Transporting Hazardous 
Materials. . . NIA 
Crash 
Crash rate indicator N/ A 
Evaluation of FMCSR Compliance Techniques; XATA OpCenter v. Company XYZ's 
Policies and Procedures 
The third part of the evaluation was to analyze XATA's OpCenter to identify the 
system's ability to assist in regulatory compliance, which was then evaluated against 
Company XYZ's current practices for complying with FMCSA's FMCSRs. XATA's 
OpCenter and Company XYZ's management practices was evaluated using a Likert scale 
weighted 1 through 5, with categories including procedure/systemls ease of useluser 
friendliness, procedure/systemfs design to comply with FMCSR, procedure/systemts data 
security (potential of data loss; see Appendix C), procedure/systemts ability to provide 
accurate and authentic data, and there ability to provide multiple levels of oversight. The 
categories for each applicable regulation were totaled and weighted (1, no violation in CR 
or SafeStat; 1.5, violations in either CR or SafeStat; 2, violations in both CR and 
SafeStat) and were based on violation from history findings. The raw data was used as a 
comparison for inherent strengths and weaknesses for the respective methods, where the 
overall weighted values were used to amplify the unique characteristics for each 
evaluated FMCSR. 
The overall scores (outlined in Table 5) between XATA and S.O.P. revealed that 
of the six categories (individual category findings are in Appendix C), Company XYZ's 
current methods were slightly more effective overall in meeting the regulatory 
compliance needs that would be provided by XATA's OpCenter 6.4 with one exception, 
that being XATA's overall score for FMCSR 395 HOS. These findings revealed that 
Company XYZ's weighted scores were superior to XATA OpCenter in their design to 
conform to FMCSRs. The second factor for a CR is driver qualification; FMCSR parts 
383 and 391, resulted in the highest overall values in the comparison-based analysis. 
These findings can be attributed primarily because the document management system for 
this category is centrally located, with copies being available to the specific locations. 
The lowest scores for Company XYZ's SOPs were in factor three, 
drivingloperating, and factor four, inspectionlmaintenance, where primary document 
control is at the individual fleet level with limited centralized document management 
oversight. XATA's OpCenter 6.4 scores and percentages were directly affected by the 
EOBR system's programming framework. The analysis indicates that Company XYZ's 
greatest deficiency came from information flow, while XATA's most notable weakness 
was a result from programming parameters. 
Table 5 
FMCSR 's Weighted Scores Between XA TA and Company XYZ 's SOP 
Regulations XATA's SOPS 
FMCSR: 5 383: C.D.L. Standards, requirements.. . 15 60% 21 84% 
FMCSR: 5 39 1 : Qualifications of Drivers ... 30 60% 44 88% 
FMCSR: fj 392: Driving CMV's 24 64% 24 64% 
FMCSR: fj  395: Hours-of-Service 46 92% 30 60% 
FMCSR: fj 393: Parts and Accessories.. . 26 52% 30 60% 
FMCSR: fj 396: Inspection Repair and Maintenance 30 60% 32 64% 
Discussion 
The findings of this research provided mixed results as to the specific regulations 
and their application into XATA OpCenter 6.4 to meet the regulatory needs of Company 
XYZ. The design of OpCenter as a platform was found to have potential data 
management capabilities for driver, truck and equipment information, but the scope for 
the specific areas were limited by the software application. Of the seven factors that are 
reviewed during a CR, only three were able to have at least a potential for application. Of 
the six FMCSRs in the three factors, only HOS was shown to have great impact on 
providing improvements over the current FMCSR management procedures. The 
application of the other five FMCSRs only provides a means of checks and balances 
within the current management procedures so long as all data locations that require 
manual data entry receive the same level of management attention. A downgrading of 
attention in any one category might possibly have negative consequences for Company 
XYZ. 
The findings for the regulatory management of the areas concerning driver 
qualification were anticipated to be in XATA OpCenter's drive management field. 
XATA OpCenter 6.4 is capable of retaining additional data in the custom fields, which 
could provide specific information regarding driver license number, expiration date, 
class, endorsements, and restrictions along with the expiration of DOT medical 
certification information. The benefit for Company XYZ to analyze this system would be 
to provide a single location for fleet management personal to go without having to 
request the information fiom human resources. The constraints with this are that several 
application screens would need to be accessed to retrieve this information. 
At the onset of this analysis there was an expectation that XATA OpCenter would 
be able to meet the oversight needs of factor three, operatingldriving. The strengths of the 
XATA OpCenter are its ability to provide information on driver's action for placing a 
vehicle into service, the drivers' operating practices and monitoring hours of service 
through a pre trip inspection, equipment inspection, and post trip inspection option, as 
well as logging capabilities that meet FMCSR 395.15. The system also provides GPS 
tracking and thus allows for time as well as location stamping of vehicles and drivers for 
log verification, the evaluation of driving habits, and providing a mechanism for 
reporting information throughout the entire fleet management structure. The limitations 
discovered were in the accuracy and completeness of information collected, most notably 
that the driver inspection process did not require a driver to fill out a checklist. The 
system's design allows for the driver to either inadvertently or intentionally corrupt the 
data at the transfer points of the driver computer, the key, or the data station. 
The analysis of the CR, Safestat, and reviewing the SOPS of Company XYZ 
found that factor four, inspectionlmaintenance, has the greatest opportunity for 
improvement. The projected implementation opportunity for XATA OpCenter was from 
data that was reviewed throughout the management structure. OpCenter's strengths were 
its ability to disseminate information throughout the entire fleet management structure. 
OpCenter provides easily accessible information on equipment information with regards 
to electrical components and management based notifications for possible repairs. 
Another strength was for the system's ability to track information relating to annual 
inspections for trucks and trailers. One constraint of the system was regarding the access 
to DOT inspection information by users who need to access several screens in order to 
retrieve the relevant information. Another limitation is the manner in which OpCenter has 
designed the programming for prelequipment changelpost trip vehicle inspection process. 
The major limitation is that the vehicle inspection function is little more than a timer, 
which notifies the fleet management only when a driver did not take the minimum time to 
complete the vehicle inspection. 
Chapter V: Conclusions and Recommendations 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate Company XYZ's current on-board 
monitoring system as an integrated tool for complying with the FMCSA's regulations 
outlined in the Code of Federal Regulation 49 for motor carrier operations. The first goal 
of the study was to evaluate how an EOBR system could assist in meeting FMCSA 
regulatory requirements. This was an evaluation of FMCSA regulations for property 
carrying motor carriers during a FMCSA compliance review. The second goal was to 
evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of an integrated XATA Corporation OpCenterQ 
EOBR to meet regulatory requirements set forth by the FMCSA for Company XYZ. 
The research evaluated three compliance reviews along with a recent run of 
SafeStat information to establish historical deficiencies, identify the effectiveness of 
abatement procedures, and reveal impediments to maintaining FMCSA compliance. The 
study also evaluated the regulation's language for compatibility within the format 
available by XATA OpCenter 6.4. Regulations not suitable for alternate formats were 
removed and the remaining regulations were weighted using values established during 
the CRs and SafeStat evaluation. The individual CR regulations were also evaluated on 
five factors to assess Company XYZ's practices for maintaining FMCSA compliance and 
then compare to the capabilities of XATA OpCenter. The final evaluation was to 
summarize the respective strengths and deficiencies for FMCSA compliance. 
Conclusions 
Following are conclusions that result from the analysis of data collected from this study: 
XATA OpCenter 6.4 EOBR platform provides limited application 
functions for the purpose of a stand-alone FMCSA compliance tool. It 
appears that no device can exceed the confines of the intended application; 
XATA OpCenter 6.4 is no different. The platform was designed for 
assisting the private motor carrier in improved asset management and 
customer service, with the added feature of a FMCSA compliant paperless 
logging feature. A motor carrier intending to implement XATA OpCenter 
as a standalone tool for complying with all aspects of FMCSRs will fail to 
meet that objective. The only FMCSR that OpCenter can monitor as a 
stand alone tool would be for meeting the HOS requirements. 
XATA OpCenter has functions that can be adopted to assist in an 
established FMCSA compliance management system. As part of the asset 
management features for tracking equipment, trucks, and drivers, non- 
dedicated fields were included. Inputting key compliance information such 
as DOT inspections on trucks and equipment, and expiration dates for 
driver's licenses and medical certifications in the respective fields may 
provide the motor carrier an additional layer of information exchange that 
could improve the overall compliance efforts. Thus, information can more 
easily be disseminated through a larger body of the fleet management 
officials. Having multiple levels of access in tracking key indicators would 
assist in developing internal auditing procedures, and when warranted, 
assist with correcting location deficiencies without tying up excess 
resources. Although the format would be cumbersome, a motor carrier 
with a dispersed fleet situation and a limited oversight structure may be 
able to justify the use XATA's OpCenter system. 
a Company XYZ's current fleet management polices and procedures may 
have exceeded their life expectancy. The investigation revealed policies 
that may not have been evaluated for extended durations with several 
polices effective date exceeding 10 years. It is questionable if the current 
polices accurately reflect the current industry, regulations, and the culture 
of the company or the communities in which Company XYZ operates. 
Recommendations 
Based on the above conclusions, following are recommendations which should be 
considered: 
a Incorporate FMCSR time-sensitive data into XATA OpCenter for broader 
tracking. At a minimum, the data should include driver's license and 
medical card expiration dates as well as the last DOT inspection on trucks 
and equipment. Employee sensitive information should be coded or 
removed from data entered primarily due to the limited security settings 
that are currently in place. 
Conduct an analysis of the fleet management procedures between the 
XATA OpCenter equipped location and the traditionally managed fleet 
locations to determine the effect which may occur on operational 
practices. With the first phase of implementation having been completed, a 
predetermined time needs to elapse prior to the investigation. 
Evaluate the capabilities of various EOBR platform systems that compare 
the company's traditional management practices and XATA OpCenter- 
equipped locations. The analysis should consist of an evaluation of the 
capabilities of XATA OpCenter along with other EOBR platforms for 
meeting the company's core objectives along with division fleet 
operations objectives. 
Company XYZ should reevaluate and correct their deficiencies with 
respect to the policies and procedures for fleet management. From the 
investigation, Company XYZYs only consistent deficiency was related to 
inspections and maintenance. The policies and procedures need to ensure 
that drivers do not place a truck or other DOT-regulated equipment into 
service that does not meet the requirements set forth by the FMCSA and 
state regulations. This includes incorporating mechanisms that ensure 
truck and DOT regulated equipment receive proper service in a timely 
manner prior to a driver placing such equipment back into service. 
Areas of Further Research 
a With the pending regulation ruling by the FMCSA regarding possible 
mandatory use of EOBR, an analysis should be conducted to evaluate any 
variation in the CR process. It is recommended this research evaluate 
changes in resource requirements, CR findings, and compare penalties 
between traditional fleet management operation to motor carriers using an 
EOBR system for fleet management. 
a Further research should also be conducted to access the effects of using 
an EOBR system on a company's SafeStat safety fitness score. 
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Appendix B: SafeStat Period FMCSR Part and Violation Explanation 
CODE DESCRIPTION PERIOD 1 
392.2 Local laws-general End Sept 
392.2 Local laws general Start April 
392.2W Size and weight 
392.7 No pre-trip inspection 
390.2 1 B Carrier name not displayed 
393.25F Stop Lamp 
393.26 Requirements for reflectors 
393.26 Requirements for reflectors 
393.45B2 Brake hoseltubing chaffing andlor kinking 
393.60C Damaged or discolored windshield 
393.75C Tire tread depth 
393.95A No/discharged/unsecured fire extinguisher 
393.100A Improper load securement 
393.209E Power steering violations 
395.8 Log violation 
395.8K2 Failure to retain previous logs 
395.9F1 No log book 
396.17C Operating w/o periodic inspection 
396.17C Operating without periodic inspection 
CODE DESCRIPTION PERIOD 2 
390.2 1A Not regulation marked 
3 90.2 1 E Improper marking (rented CMV) End May 
392.2 Local laws general Start Sept 
392.2 Local laws-general 
392.2 Local laws 
392.2 Local laws 
392.2 Local laws 
392.2 Local laws 
392.2 Local laws-general 
392.7 No pretrip inspection 
393.9A Inoperable lamp 
393.9A Inoperable lamp 
393.9A Inoperable required lamp 
3 93.19 TudHazard lamp 
393.25F Stop lamp violation 
393.45D Brake connections 
3 93.47 Inadequate brake lining 
393.47 Inadequate brake lining 
3 93.47 Inadequate brake lining 
393.48A Inoperative/defective brakes 
393.203B Cab improperly secured to frame 
393.205C Loose or missing wheel fasteners 
393.207A Axle positioning parts 
393.207C Leaf Spring Defectivelmissing 
396.3Al Repair and maint. Parts 
396.3AlB Brakes 
396.3AlB 1 Brake out of adjustment 
396.3AlB1 Brakes 
396.3AlB 1 Brake-reserve pressure loss 
396.3AlBA Brakes out of adjustment 
CODE DESCRIPTION 
392.2 Local laws general 
392.2 Local laws-general 
392.2 Local laws-general 
392.2 Local laws-general 
392.28 Speeding 
393.1 1 Defective lighting 
393.1 1 Defective lighting 
393.7 Fifth Wheel coupling device 
395.8 Log violation 
396.3AlB1 Brakes out of adjustment 
CODE DESCRIPTION 
391.4A No medical certificate 
392.2 Local laws-general 
392.2 Local laws-general 
392.2 Local laws general 
393.1 1 Noldefective lighting devices 
393.1 1 Noldefective lighting devices 
393.25F Stop lamp violation 
393.25F Stop lamp violation 
393.25F Stop lamp violation 
393.19 Defectivelno turnhazard lamp 
393.47 Inadequate brake lining 
393.75C Tire tread depth 
393.75C Tire tread depth 
393.75F2 Tire under-inflated 
393.75F2 Tire under-inflated 
396.3A1 Inspectiodrepair and maint parts 
396.3Al B Inspectiodrepair and maint parts 
396.3AlBL Brake-reserve system pressure loss 
PERIOD 3 
End Sept 
Start April 
PERIOD 4 
End May 
Start Sept 
CODE DESCRIPTION 
Carrier name andlor USDOT not 
390.2 1 B displayed 
392.2 Local laws-general 
392.2 Local laws-general 
392.2 Local laws-general 
392.2 Local laws-general 
393.9 Inoperable required lamp 
393.26 Requirements for reflectors 
393.43D Noldefective automatic trailer brake 
Brake hoseltubing chaffing andor 
393.45A4 kinking 
393.75B Tire-front tread depth less than 4/32 
393.20 1 A Frame crackedloose/sagging/broken 
393.2032 Wheel fasteners loose andlor missing 
393.207A Axle positioning parts defectivelmissing 
Must have knowledge and comply with 
396.1 regs 
396.3Al Inspectiodrepair and maint. Parts 
396.3Al Inspectiodrepair and maint parts 
396.3AlB Brakes-general 
396.3Al B Brakes-general 
396.3AlBA Brakes out of adjustment 
396.3AlBL Brake-reserve system pressure loss 
396.5 Excessive oil leaks 
396.1 1 Driver vehicle inspection report 
PERIOD 5 
End Sept 
Start April 
Appendix C: FMCSR Comparison Table 
XATA 1 SOPS 
FMCSR: $383 $391 $392 $393 $395 $396 Regulation Rating 
CategoryIExplanation 1 2 3 4 5  
Ease of use (User f r i e n d 1 i n e s s ) l  
Will the operating procedurelsystern provide a consistent format that will be understandable 
to all users and what level of laborleffort to complete, store, retrieve, and analyze? (1 = 
difficultllabor intensive to complete, store. retrieve, and analyze, 2 = between 1 and 3, 3 = 
Moderate levels of difficultllabor intensive to complete, store, retrieve, and analyze, 4 = 
between 3 and 5 , 5  = simple and minimal labor to complete, store, retrieve, and analyze) 
Regulation Specific (Management tool specificity to F M C S R ' S ) ~  
What Percentage of the FMCSR will be able to be met by the operating procedurelsystem? (1 
=0-20,2=21-40,3=41-60,4=61-80,5= 81-100) 
Data Security (potential of data 1oss)I 1 1 1 1 1 
What is the exposure to the company for lostlmissing/incomplete data from the operating 
procedurelsystern? (1 = broad levels of opportunities for loss or corruption of data, 2 = between 1 
and 3 , 3  = minimal levels of opportunities for loss or corruption of data, 4 = between 3 and 5, 5 = 
catastrophic level only of risk for loss or corruption of data) 
( ACCURACY ) ~eliabilitd 1 1 1 1 1 
What level of opportunity exists for fraudulent information to be documented? (1 = broad 
opportunities fraudulent data, 2 = between 1 and 3 , 3  = Moderate opportunities fraudulent data, 4 
= between 3 and 5 , 5  = minimal opportunities fraudulent data) 
Data Verification (oversight)  
What level of oversight is available in the operating procedurelsystem to ensure that FMCSR is in 
compliance? (1 = not able to verify that there is verification of FMCSR oversight at any level, 2 = 
between 1 and 3 , 3  = verification of FMCSR oversight on a single level, 4 = between 3 and 5, 5 = 
verification of FMCSR oversight on multiple levels). 
Evaluation Score 0 
(FMCSR weight): - 
FMCSR weighted score: - 0 
Procedure/Systemls ability to provide accurat and authentic d 
Procedure/Systemls Design to comply with FMCS 
Procedure/Systemls Data Security (potential of data 10s 
Procedure/Systemls ability to provide accurat and authentic dat 
Procedure/Systemls ability to provide accurat and authentic dat 
Procedure/Systemls Ease of useluser friendline 
Procedure/Systemls Design to comply with FMCS 
Procedure/Systemls Ease of useNser friendline 
Procedure/System's Design to comply with FMCS 
;MCSR: 5 396: Inspection Repair and Maintenance 
Procedure/Systemls Ease of use~User friendliness 1 1 
Procedure/Systemls Design to comply with FMCSR 1 1 
Procedure/Systemls Data Security (potential of data loss) 1 1 
Procedure/Systemls ability to provide accurat and authentic data 1 1 
Procedure/Systemls to provide multiple levels of oversight 1 1 
